

The Honorable John C. Coughenour

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
AT SEATTLE

YIM, *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CITY OF SEATTLE,

Defendant.

No. 2:18-cv-736-JCC

CITY OF SEATTLE'S **REPLY**  
REGARDING ITS MOTION TO CERTIFY  
A QUESTION TO THE WASHINGTON  
SUPREME COURT

NOTE ON MOTION CALENDAR:  
Friday, February 1, 2019

Certification is appropriate here. Plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary lack merit. The City respectfully asks this Court to exercise its discretion to certify to the Washington Supreme Court the question of what analysis that court applies to a substantive due process claim arising under the Washington Constitution.

Plaintiffs do not dispute that comity and federalism favor allowing a state's highest court to resolve difficult state constitutional law questions.<sup>1</sup> Nor do Plaintiffs question the judicial economy of certification here.<sup>2</sup> Instead of predicting whether and how the Washington Supreme Court will answer the due process question in *Yim I*, this Court can pose the question directly.

<sup>1</sup> See *Barnes-Wallace v. City of San Diego*, 607 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2010); City's Mot. to Certify, Dkt. # 51 at 5. The same is true of important state statutory and common law questions. See, e.g., *Moore v. King Cty. Fire Prot. Dist.* No. 26, 545 F.3d 761, 763 (9th Cir. 2008); *Kremen v. Cohen*, 325 F.3d 1035, 1037 – 38 (9th Cir. 2003).

<sup>2</sup> See City's Mot. to Certify, Dkt. # 51 at 5.

1 Resolving it will not take long—because the same lawyers on behalf of virtually the same parties  
 2 have already briefed the same question before the Washington Supreme Court in *Yim I*, any  
 3 supplemental briefing to that Court on a certified *Yim II* question could occur quickly.

4 The question is subject to certification because Washington’s law of substantive due  
 5 process has not been clearly determined.<sup>3</sup> Plaintiffs devote much of their response to rehashing  
 6 the merits of their summary judgment motion, arguing that the Washington Supreme Court  
 7 would apply the “undue oppression” analysis in a case like this.<sup>4</sup> That fails to prove the question  
 8 is settled, especially given the City’s summary judgment briefing countering Plaintiffs’  
 9 arguments.<sup>5</sup> Lower courts agree Washington’s substantive due process law is unsettled. The  
 10 Washington Court of Appeals in 2015 “acknowledge[d] that there appears to be some confusion  
 11 over the proper test to apply” to a substantive due process challenge, so applied both tests to  
 12 reject the challenge.<sup>6</sup> And a King County Superior Court judge last year concluded “the case law  
 13 applying the standard of review in a ‘substantive due process claim’ has produced a rather murky  
 14 area of case law and needs clarification.”<sup>7</sup>

15 Certification is appropriate because, unless this Court rules for one party under both the  
 16 “rational basis” and “undue oppression” analyses, this Court needs an answer from the  
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19 <sup>3</sup> RCW 2.60.020 (authorizing certification when “the local law has not been clearly determined”).

20 <sup>4</sup> Pls. Opp. to Motion to Certify, Dkt. # 52 at 3 – 7.

21 <sup>5</sup> See City’s Opp. & Cross Mot., Dkt. # 33 at 22 – 27; City’s Reply in Supp. of Cross Mot., Dkt. # 50 at 8 – 11. To  
 22 the extent Plaintiffs’ response raises new arguments, the City does not concede them. Belaboring such arguments in  
 23 this motion serves no purpose.

<sup>6</sup> *Cannatronics v. City of Tacoma*, 190 Wn. App. 1005, 2015 WL 5350873 \*4 n.7 (2015, unpublished).

<sup>7</sup> Order Granting City of Seattle’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying RHA’s Cross Motion for  
 Summary Judgment, *Rental Housing Ass’n v. City of Seattle*, King County Superior Court No. 17-2-13662-0 SEA at  
 10:17 – 18 (Sept. 19, 2018). **Appendix 1.** Although RHA appealed that decision, the Washington Court of Appeals  
 dismissed the appeal on RHA’s request. **Appendix 2.**

1 Washington Supreme Court to dispose of this case.<sup>8</sup> Only with that answer can this Court  
 2 efficiently consider the facts of this case and dispose of it. Plaintiffs misread *Bylsma* as holding  
 3 the answer to a certified question must be outcome determinative.<sup>9</sup> *Bylsma* noted an answer from  
 4 the Washington Supreme Court would be outcome determinative there, but announced no rule  
 5 that an answer *must be* outcome determinative to certify the question.<sup>10</sup> *Bylsma* used “outcome  
 6 determinative” only to mean that, with the legal question answered, the federal case could  
 7 proceed by applying the law to the facts—which is why the Ninth Circuit remanded *Bylsma* to  
 8 the District Court after receiving the Washington Supreme Court’s answer.<sup>11</sup>

9 The City has proceeded expeditiously in good faith. Plaintiffs’ claims of undue delay are  
 10 unfounded. Last May—facing the short window in which to remove this case and its core First  
 11 Amendment claim to federal court—the City did not know whether the Washington Supreme  
 12 Court would accept direct review of *Yim I*. Had that Court sent *Yim I* to the Washington Court of  
 13 Appeals, the City likely would not have sought certification from this Court. In its opening brief  
 14 on cross motions for summary judgment in *Yim II*, the City notified this Court and Plaintiffs  
 15 about *Yim I* and the prospect of the City asking this Court to certify once the parties completed  
 16 their *Yim II* summary judgment briefing.<sup>12</sup> And the City filed its motion to certify with its final  
 17 brief on the cross motions.<sup>13</sup> The City had to wait for that briefing to conclude—without it, this  
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19 \_\_\_\_\_  
 20 <sup>8</sup> RCW 2.60.020 (authorizing certification when “it is necessary to ascertain the local law of this state in order to  
 dispose of such proceeding”).

21 <sup>9</sup> Pls. Opp. to Motion to Certify, Dkt. # 52 at 3:14 – 15 (citing *Bylsma v. Burger King Corp.*, 676 F.3d 779, 783 (9th  
 Cir. 2012)).

22 <sup>10</sup> *Bylsma*, 676 F.3d at 783.

23 <sup>11</sup> *Bylsma v. Burger King Corp.*, 706 F.3d 930, 931 – 32 (9th Cir. 2013).

<sup>12</sup> City’s Opp. & Cross Mot., Dkt. # 33 at 33:1 – 8.

<sup>13</sup> See City’s Reply in Supp. of Cross Mot., Dkt. # 50; City’s Mot. to Cert. a Question, Dkt. # 51.

1 Court could not assess the status of Washington’s substantive due process law or have a  
 2 complete record to transmit to the Washington Supreme Court.<sup>14</sup>

3 Plaintiffs find no Ninth Circuit authority supporting their suggestion that the City is  
 4 gaming the system by seeking certification after removing this case from a state court. The Ninth  
 5 Circuit warns against a party seeking certification to get a second chance of victory after an  
 6 adverse District Court ruling, but that concern is not germane here.<sup>15</sup> Plaintiffs turn to a Fourth  
 7 Circuit *dictum* disfavoring certification when a party removed the case to federal court after an  
 8 adverse state court ruling,<sup>16</sup> but overlook a later ruling explaining that court’s real concern is the  
 9 one voiced by the Ninth Circuit: a party seeking certification to “forum shop” after an adverse  
 10 ruling from a lower federal or state court.<sup>17</sup> Plaintiffs also invoke a Seventh Circuit decision,<sup>18</sup>  
 11 overlooking a later Seventh Circuit decision explaining that whether the party seeking  
 12 certification had removed the case to federal court is “not a primary factor” when deciding  
 13 whether to certify a question.<sup>19</sup>

14 Plaintiffs fail to substantiate their claim that certification of the due process question  
 15 would cause intolerable delay in resolving their First Amendment claim. Plaintiffs cite only cases  
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17 <sup>14</sup> See RCW 2.60.020 (the federal court must assess whether Washington law has not been clearly determined);  
 18 RCW 2.60.030(2) (the certificate procedure “shall include and be based upon the record”).

19 <sup>15</sup> See, e.g., *Alliance for Prop. Rights & Fiscal Responsibility v. City of Idaho Falls*, 742 F.3d 1100, 1108 (9th Cir. 2013); *Thompson v Paul*, 547 F.3d 1055, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008).

20 <sup>16</sup> Pls. Opp. to Motion to Certify, Dkt. # 52 at 7 – 8 (citing *National Bank of Wash. v. Pearson*, 863 F.2d 322, 327  
 21 (4th Cir. 1988)). “Certification would be inappropriate here, however, because Pearson himself removed this case  
 from Maryland state court *after the Maryland judge decided the question against him.*” *National Bank*, 863 F.2d at  
 327 (emphasis added). *National Bank* appears to have raised and dismissed the prospect of certification on its own,  
 not in response to a motion to certify. See *id.* at 326 – 27.

22 <sup>17</sup> *Allen v. Choice Hotels Intern., Inc.*, 276 Fed. Appx. 339, 341 (4th Cir. 2008).

23 <sup>18</sup> Pls. Opp. to Motion to Certify, Dkt. # 52 at 8:6 – 9 (citing *Doe v. City of Chicago*, 360 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2004)).

<sup>19</sup> *Rain v. Rolls-Royce Corp.*, 626 F.3d 372, 378 – 79 (7th Cir. 2010).

noting the delay resulting from a federal court invoking the abstention doctrine to send a case to a state trial court.<sup>20</sup> But federal courts look to certification—which sends a question directly to the highest state court—as a relatively expeditious alternative to abstention.<sup>21</sup> Plaintiffs claim no First Amendment damages and do not explain how they would be prejudiced by delay, let alone why that prejudice outweighs the benefits of allowing the Washington Supreme Court to resolve a key question of Washington constitutional law.

The City respectfully asks this Court to exercise its discretion to certify the question of what analysis applies to a substantive due process claim under the Washington Constitution and stay further proceedings in *Yim II* pending resolution of the certified question.

Respectfully submitted, February 1, 2019,

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<sup>20</sup> Pls. Opp. to Motion to Certify, Dkt. # 52 at 9:14 – 14 (citing *Zwickler v. Koota*, 389 U.S. 241, 252 (1967); *Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet*, 750 F.3d 776, 784 (9th Cir. 2014); *Porter v. Jones*, 319 F.3d 483, 492 – 93 (9th Cir. 2003)). Plaintiffs cite a Ninth Circuit dissent raising concerns about delay arising from certification, without acknowledging that the majority certified the question despite those concerns. *Id.* at 9:14 – 16 (citing *Kremen*, 325 F.3d at 1044 (Kozinski, J., dissenting)). *Cf. Kremen*, 325 F.3d at 1037 – 38 (majority's rationale for certification).

<sup>21</sup> See, e.g., *Lehman Bros. v. Schein*, 416 U.S. 386, 391, 394 (1974) (certification would “engender less delay and create fewer additional expenses for litigants than would abstention”).

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I certify that on this day I electronically filed this document and its two appendices with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to:

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DATED February 1, 2019.

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